Thomas Bugnyar  by Bugnyar, Thomas
Magazine
R549
most jarring during his discussion on 
the two pandemics so far this century, 
SARS and swine flu. When discussing 
SARS, he describes media coverage 
as ‘alarmist’, suggests that public 
health workers used the outbreak to 
demonstrate that their field was still 
relevant, and claims that firm actions 
by governments, such as imposing 
quarantine and closing schools, were 
more about restoring the confidence of 
investors than anything else. He even 
goes as far as to question whether the 
disease might have simply died out 
‘naturally’. Although Harrison’s insights 
into how governments reacted during 
the SARS outbreak are fascinating, 
readers might interpret his arguments 
differently if given more information on 
the biology and epidemiology of the 
virus. For example, early in the outbreak 
it was not known that patients were 
only infectious when symptomatic, 
and it was only this fact that meant 
that spread of the disease could be 
halted through public health measures 
and that the dire predictions of some 
epidemiologists were not realised. 
Similarly, he suggests that the high 
number of projected deaths from swine 
flu were “used to garner more resources 
for a hitherto beleaguered branch of 
medicine”. But Harrison fails to explain 
that in the early days of the outbreak 
all evidence pointed towards swine flu 
being much more virulent than it turned 
out to be. Despite these quibbles, 
Harrison provides an illuminating 
account of the political and economic 
repercussions of epidemic disease in 
the past and in the modern era. 
Contagion is not for the faint of 
heart. It is rich in historical detail, and 
all of the resources are meticulously 
referenced, but there is little on what 
life was like for those affected by 
infectious disease, and even less on 
the biology of the pathogens, making 
for a very dry read. Indeed, the story of 
the Eclair stands out as one of the few 
accounts in the book where the reader 
can get a real sense of the characters 
involved and can fully engage with 
the narrative. Nevertheless, the book 
gives us a convincing insight into how 
the spread of infectious disease has 
profoundly influenced international 
politics and trade, and for this it should 
be applauded. 
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spread of disease, and how disease 
has been used as an excuse to control 
commerce. As we saw with the Eclair 
incident, one of the major themes of the 
book is how scientific understanding 
has been manipulated to serve the 
political interests of those in power. 
At the risk of gross oversimplification, 
Harrison describes two schools of 
thought that have surrounded our 
understanding of what we now know to 
be infectious disease: the contagionists, 
who believed in the transmission of 
disease by people, animals and goods, 
and the non-contagionists, who were 
more inclined to blame meteorological 
conditions, or filthy air. Of course, 
most people did not fall neatly into one 
camp or the other, such as those who 
believed in contagion, but only when the 
meteorological conditions were right, 
but these were the general tendencies. 
As a general rule, the contagionists 
were more cautious in nature, often 
arguing in favour of the quarantine of 
ships to prevent the spread of disease, 
whereas non-contagionists were 
opposed to quarantine and instead 
extolled the virtues of democracy and 
free trade. Harrison not only documents 
the theories of the time surrounding our 
changing understanding of infectious 
disease and the measures used to 
control it, but also describes how 
measures to prevent disease have been 
abused for political and economic gain. 
Unfortunately, Harrison often 
seems reluctant to reveal our current 
biological understanding of infectious 
disease, for example, that malaria and 
yellow fever require mosquitos, that 
rodents are the primary host of plague, 
and that cholera is spread through 
contaminated drinking water. By making 
this knowledge explicit, it might have 
enabled the twenty-first century reader 
to be a little more sympathetic to the 
scientists, physicians and politicians 
of the time who subscribed to the non-
contagionist view. For example, at a 
time when almost nothing was known 
about the natural history of malaria, it 
would have been eminently sensible to 
blame the increased incidence of the 
disease at certain times of the year on 
meteorological conditions. Although 
I find most of Harrison’s arguments 
convincing, omitting the biological detail 
makes it easier to support his thesis 
that scientific knowledge has frequently 
been manipulated to serve the interests 
of those making the decisions. 
This lack of integration of scientific 
knowledge into Harrison’s narrative is Thomas Bugnyar
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What got you interested in biology 
in the first instance? Ever since early 
childhood, I have been fascinated 
by animals. I wrote in the friendship 
books of my classmates that I wanted 
to become an ‘animal researcher’. 
Later I learned that the proper name is 
biologist.
Around the time I started at 
university, I got interested in animal 
behaviour after reading the books 
of Dian Fossey, Jane Goodall and 
Konrad Lorenz. Fortunately, in the 
early 90s Vienna became a great 
place to study animal behaviour 
because of the diversity of fields 
and approaches covered by different 
working groups, from behavioural 
ecology and physiology to human 
ethology. I took every possible course 
and soon wondered about the lack 
of cognitive questions aside in the 
primate literature. I nevertheless got 
hooked on such kinds of questions 
and didn’t have to think for long 
when I got the chance to join a newly 
formed group on animal learning and 
concept formation. They also had 
a colony of common marmosets, 
which I chose as subjects for my first 
scientific studies. 
How did you come to study ravens? 
As a student, I visited a friend at the 
Konrad Lorenz Research Station 
in the Austrian Alps who had just 
hand-raised a group of ravens. 
When I saw the playfulness of these 
birds, I was struck by the richness of 
their behavioural repertoire — they 
reminded me more of puppy dogs 
than of normal songbirds. I was also 
fascinated by the curious way they 
can look at you, which reminded 
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primates. So I happily took the offer 
to study ravens for my PhD. My task 
seemed simple at the time: just find 
out how intelligent they are. But I now 
know that this is a question for a life-
long research project. 
Is it true that corvids are the 
smartest birds? Corvids have large 
brains, show a high behavioural 
flexibility and live in a diverse range 
of habitats. These features are likely 
interlinked and indicate considerable 
flexibility in decision-making. So, 
yes, they certainly can be considered 
‘smart’ birds. But I wouldn’t claim 
that corvids are the smartest birds. 
First, advanced cognitive skills are 
also found in other avian groups, 
such as parrots, and there are several 
avian taxa with relatively large brains 
(for example, woodpeckers) and/or 
ecological and social complexity (for 
example, gulls) that have barely been 
tested for their cognitive skills. And 
second, it is difficult to say how smart 
‘corvids’ are because it depends very 
much which corvid species we’re 
talking about. Out of the around 120 
described species, only a handful 
have been studied so far, and even 
those only in a limited number of 
contexts and paradigms. For instance, 
tool use has been investigated 
predominantly in New Caledonian 
crows and mental time travel mainly 
in Western scrub jays. So it is just too 
early to say.
Is this because research on avian 
cognition is a relatively recent 
development, or could it just be that 
researchers are skilled in picking the 
best species for their questions? I 
think it’s a combination of the two. 
Cognitive studies on birds in general, 
and corvids in particular, are relatively 
new, and within the short time 
period of roughly 25 years we could 
not achieve a level of knowledge 
comparable to the vast literature on 
primates. Of course, the few labs 
working on corvids have chosen their 
model species carefully according to 
their research questions, and there’s 
nothing wrong with this. It is just when 
one tries to take a broad view that 
this might lead to the impression of 
cherry-picking the best species for 
any given skill in corvids (perhaps so 
that they can rival the competence of 
another given species or taxon, say 
chimps or other apes).So what is left of the idea of corvids 
being ‘feathered apes’ or ‘primates 
of the sky’? The first comparisons 
were relatively rough, but they 
were tremendously important for 
the field. They certainly rocked our 
intuitive understanding of cognitive 
evolution, and the assumption that 
primates are always on top. But it 
does not really matter which species 
is ‘smartest’ or which taxonomic 
group is ‘most advanced’. The critical 
point about the ‘feathered ape’ 
idea is to consider the possibility of 
convergent evolution: that is, that 
certain socio-ecological selection 
pressures may have favoured the 
evolution of similar cognitive skills 
in phylogenetically distant species. 
Because the last common ancestor 
of birds and mammals lived about 
300 million years ago, birds such as 
corvids are perfectly suited to test 
hypotheses about brain evolution 
and intelligence — mostly developed 
based exclusively on primates/
mammals — independently of 
phylogeny. In this respect, it is also 
worth mentioning that avian brains 
are very differently organized than 
mammalian brains, indicating that 
complex cognitive solutions can be 
achieved using very different neural 
structures and circuits (for example, 
without a neocortex). 
What are the next steps in 
this research field? We have 
just scratched the surface of 
understanding what conditions can 
drive the evolution of what types 
of cognition. There is ample room 
for improvement, from theoretical 
and conceptual considerations 
to methodological refinements. 
One possibility would be to make 
a better use of the comparative 
approach within the corvid clade. 
Corvids vary in feeding ecology (for 
example, short-term versus long-term 
hoarders), breeding biology (territorial, 
communal and cooperative breeders) 
and social structure (types of social 
relationships, degree of fission–fusion 
dynamics), which makes them perfect 
candidates for testing which factors 
are important for the evolution of 
particular skills. 
Take food caching, probably the 
best investigated trait in corvids, 
where several findings fit a coherent 
picture: first, long-term hoarding 
species tend to outperform short-term 
hoarders in spatial abilities; second, memory for the what-where-when of a 
caching episode appears to be highly 
relevant for short-term hoarders that 
cache a broad spectrum of food; and 
third, socially competitive species 
seem also capable of remembering 
who saw them caching, and 
implement cache defense strategies 
accordingly. 
Unfortunately, this picture is 
anything but complete, as we hardly 
know about the what-where-when 
memory of long-term hoarders or 
the observational capacities of birds 
with different breeding systems 
and social structures, respectively. 
In other contexts, things are even 
less clear. New Caledonian crows, 
for example, are the only corvids 
that habitually use and manufacture 
tools; still, other corvids like rooks 
seem to be on par with them with 
respect to tool selectivity and problem 
solving by analogy, at least when 
tested in captivity. This shows that 
cognitive traits may not always be 
an adaption to very particular socio-
ecological conditions. Probably for 
feeding generalists, the key strategy 
is to evolve general problem solving 
capacities that are shaped by 
experience. Fortunately, with their 
relatively short maturational period of 
a few months, corvids are also great 
model systems for ontogenetical 
studies.
Why focus on corvids — aren’t 
you interested in the bigger 
picture? Of course. One of my 
ultimate goals is to substantially 
contribute to such a broad, cross-
taxon picture. My colleagues and I 
have several ideas for research on 
a broader taxonomic scale. I also 
welcome the increasing number of 
groups that are investigating the 
socio-cognitive skills of birds other 
than corvids. The problem is that 
we have to be extra careful when 
comparing different taxonomic 
groups. Standardized test batteries 
are great, but often preferentially tap 
into the predispositions of the species 
they were originally designed for. 
For instance, primates can use their 
hands or feet to reach into a tube; 
birds need to use their beak but may 
be reluctant to do so if it requires 
inserting their whole head. Sometimes 
subtle differences in motivation turn 
out to be critical. For instance, when 
ravens find playing with paper strips 
rewarding independently of whether 
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What are dermatophytes? 
Dermatophytes are fungal pathogens 
(…phytes) that cause diseases 
of the skin (dermato…). These 
fungi grow as filaments or hyphae, 
forming molds. Dermatophytes are 
the causative agent of cutaneous 
mycoses, including athlete’s foot, 
ringworm, and nail infections (Figure 
1). The scientific name of the disease 
is given by the word ‘tinea’ followed 
by the location of the infection; 
for example, Tinea pedis refers to 
athlete’s foot and Tinea capitis refers 
to scalp ringworm. Dermatophytes 
are the most common cause of fungal 
infections worldwide, although the 
type of infection varies. Developed 
countries have a higher prevalence 
of athlete’s foot, while developing 
countries have a higher prevalence 
of Tinea capitis and Tinea corporis 
(body).
The dermatophytes include 
three genera of molds in the class 
Euascomycetes — Trichophyton, 
Microsporum, and Epidermophyton 
— although the genera are not 
distinct within the phylogeny. The 
dermatophytes occupy three different 
ecological niches, classified as 
anthropophilic (human-associated), 
zoophilic (animal-associated) or 
geophilic (soil-dwelling). Species from 
all three niches are associated with 
clinical human disease. 
Why do dermatophytes cause so 
many different types of disease?  All 
dermatophytes infect host surfaces 
containing keratin, including skin, 
hair, and nails. As such, the same 
infecting organism could cause 
disease in the foot, fingernail, body, 
or head. Both climate and lifestyle 
contribute to the prevalence of 
dermatophyte infections. Tropical 
climates and overcrowding 
predispose populations to 
dermatophyte infections. Increased 
urbanization, including the use of 
occlusive footwear, community 
showers, and participation in sports, 
has been linked to higher prevalence 
Quick guidethey contain small pieces of food, this likely contributes to their chance 
performance in their choices between 
strips in a support problem task, even 
in the simplest configurations. 
I should add that many of the 
problems encountered when 
comparing distantly related species 
may also apply to comparing 
members of the same taxonomic 
group or even the same species in 
different labs. Prosocial choices in 
chimpanzees, for example, seem to 
be highly sensitive to context and 
task. Even observational studies on 
different groups may reveal different 
results, as the post-conflict behaviour 
in chimpanzees has been shown to 
function as consolation for the victims 
of aggression in some groups, but as 
protection from redirected aggression 
in other groups. As flexibility is one 
of the key characteristics of higher 
cognitive systems, such variability 
should not be surprising. But 
understanding the contextual variation 
of given skills is everything else but 
simple, and seems likely to become a 
very hot topic in future research. 
Could it be that laboratory data are 
biased in one or the other direction, 
and thus do not provide the ‘true’ 
picture of corvid intelligence? Sure, 
but it depends a lot on what you 
mean by ‘true’ picture. Laboratory 
results give us insight into the mind 
of particular subjects tested under 
particular circumstances and with 
particular experimental histories. 
That’s a ‘true’ enough picture, as 
long as we are careful in not over-
generalizing to the entire species 
or even broader taxonomic groups 
on the basis of a few results. 
Unfortunately, this is what is often 
done. For instance, if one out of ten 
captive ravens solves a particular 
problem in a complex task, we may 
conclude that it is in the range of 
cognitive capacities of ravens and 
thus of corvids; however, it says little 
about how relevant this skill is for 
ravens, or corvids in general, under 
daily life conditions. 
How do you cope with this problem? 
For me personally, the best way to 
keep laboratory results in context 
is to also investigate the patterns 
of interest in the wild. Studying 
animals under field conditions is 
quite challenging but it gives us 
a richer idea of when and how abilities are actually used, and very 
often inspires set-ups and further 
questions for the lab. That is why I 
am particularly proud of the advances 
made at our field sites, where we 
have access to a population of about 
220 individually marked ravens and 
almost 300 marked crows now. 
But both field sites are in human-
influenced environments, so some of 
my colleagues are rightly questioning 
the generality of the findings obtained 
under those conditions. So we are 
back to the question of what is a 
‘true’ picture, in this case what is 
the ‘natural’ environment for highly 
generalist feeders and scavengers like 
crows and ravens.
You are a co-founder of the 
Department of Cognitive Biology: 
is studying animals in the wild 
what you mean with a biological 
approach to cognition? No, studying 
animals under field conditions is 
only one aspect of our approach: 
we also do plenty of lab work. Our 
general aim is to foster comparative, 
evolutionary thinking in cognitive 
research. While much has been 
achieved in this respect in the last 
decades, we see ample room for 
improvement. Most notably, many 
theories about the evolution of ‘higher 
forms’ of cognition remain relatively 
vague, and many core concepts 
are biased towards primates and/or 
constrained by definitions based 
on human standards. As you have 
probably guessed, we also strongly 
support truly fair comparisons, not 
only between non-human animals but 
also when comparing the abilities of 
animals with those of humans. This 
means, for example, testing humans 
without verbal instructions. And, of 
course, we aim to contribute to the 
integration of different approaches 
and to the bridging of fields, in my 
case combining the powerful testing 
paradigms of psychology with 
standardized ethological observations 
under daily life, and also non-invasive 
physiological measures such as 
hormone metabolites in saliva or 
feces. So we intend to promote a 
very integrative and inter-disciplinary 
approach to studying cognition and 
its evolution.
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